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INDUSTRY WATCH
The Future
of 
Petroleum 
Security
in ASEAN
Structural 
changes in 
Asia’s demand 
for petroleum 
threaten to 
disrupt supply 
stability, 
especially for 
Southeast Asia. 
By Christopher Dula
Oil demand in ASEAN 
is expected to increase 
to 6.8 million barrels 
per day by 2035.
i g n i f i c a n t  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d 
cooperation between ASEAN members 
is required to shore up reliable and 
affordable access to petroleum1.
Although the people of ASEAN 
consume energy at a rate of half the global 
average per person, the energy demand 
in these countries—Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam—has collectively 
increased more than two-and-a-half times 
since 1990.2  Moreover, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) projects overall 
energy demand in ASEAN to increase 
by an additional 80 percent by 2035, 
assuming a three-fold increase in economic 
output as the population of ASEAN 
countries approaches 750 million.
According to the IEA, the 
transportation and industry sectors will 
be among the main drivers for increasing 
demand, where energy consumption is 
expected to grow by 88 percent and 90 
percent respectively over the next 15 to 20 
years. Most of this demand will probably 
be met by a combination of coal, natural 
gas and oil—of which oil will continue to 
be the more strategic resource, given that 
S the transportation sector cannot easily 
substitute other primary fuels into its 
energy mix.
Evolution of oil demand
Under these growth assumptions, oil 
demand in the ASEAN region is expected 
to increase to 6.8 million barrels per day 
(mb/d) from a current consumption rate 
of 4.4 mb/d. This would make ASEAN, 
which is already a net importer of 1.9 
mb/d, the fourth largest importer after 
China, India and the European Union.3 
However, it is worth noting that there is 
quite a bit of disparity in import volume 
among ASEAN members, which makes 
coordinated policy efforts diffi cult—and 
a lack of such coordination hinders their 
ability to compete with increased product 
demand from neighbouring countries.
China is absolutely Asia’s largest 
consumer of oil, burning some 10.8 mb/d 
or about 12 percent of global demand. 
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The second largest consumer is Japan, but as a maturing 
economy, its demand for oil will slowly diminish. India, ranking 
third at 3.7 mb/d, has been experiencing a steady annual 
demand increase of 3 percent, which will no doubt accelerate 
with economic expansion.4 In all, Asia will account for 
about two-thirds of increased global demand for oil by the 
end of 2015 (refer to Figure 1). 
This rise in demand is now shifting supply routes to 
different demand centres across Asia. Last year, producers in 
the Americas began selling crude to refi ners in Northeast Asia, 
despite persistently cheap oil prices from increased 
Saudi production, Asia’s dominant supplier. Just recently, 
U.S. and Latin American oil was shipped to refineries in 
China, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan for the fi rst time in over 
a decade.5  
Securing supply
The growing number of suppliers is potentially beneficial 
for price stability and access to oil in Asia since it reduces 
dependency on Saudi production and diversifi es supply. However, 
the characteristics of crude differs depending on where it 
originates. Most refi neries in Asia are confi gured to process 
Middle Eastern crude, which can be refi ned through simpler 
and cheaper methods in comparison to heavier variants from 
the Americas. This puts ASEAN countries at increasing risk of 
becoming captive buyers (refer to Figure 2).
Growth in new refi ning capacity in Asia has been sluggish, 
and worldwide capacity has actually declined slightly in 
the past few years.6  This creates the potential for downstream 
bottlenecks in regional supply. China and India have thus 
invested in additional sophisticated refining capabilities to 
handle more flexible inputs. For instance, one of the largest 
and most versatile plants in the world is Reliance Industries’ 
Jamnagar Refinery in Gujarat, India. Such flexibility and 
scale also permits a stronger bargaining posture with 
producers. With the exception of Singapore, other ASEAN 
countries lack the expertise to refine crude oil other than 
that which is available domestically or imported from the 
WORLD PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION BY REGION
(MILLION BARRELS PER DAY)
FIGURE 1 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012)
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DAILY TRANSIT VOLUMES THROUGH WORLD MARITIME OIL CHOKEPOINTS
(MILLION BARRELS PER DAY)
FIGURE 2 *All estimates are based on 2013 data
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014)
Middle East, usually from Kuwait 
or Saudi Arabia. And in terms of 
upstream domestic  production, 
Southeast Asia faces dwindling reserves. 
But because ASEAN is obviously more 
fragmented than China and India, a 
shared petroleum infrastructure investment and 
policy is more complicated.
UPSTREAM WOES
Though formerly a net oil exporter, 
Indonesia became a net importer in 
2004. The country is now a mature 
producer, as its productive fields have 
peaked. Oil output is on the decline 
and new developments will require 
more technically challenging extraction 
methods such as deep-water drilling 
and enhanced oil recover y (EOR) 
techniques for mature fi elds. Nonetheless, 
Indonesia remains the largest producer 
in ASEAN and its abundant coal reserves 
open the possibility of coal-to-liquid 
production in a pinch. 
Malaysia, ASEAN’s second largest 
producer, has seen steady declines 
since 2003. Its demand is expected to 
overtake production by the end of the 
decade. The government aims to slow 
this decline by offering tax incentives 
to attract investments into marginal 
fi elds and EOR developments.
Brunei, though rich in resources 
for its size, has insufficient reserves 
to meet rising regional demand. And 
80%
increase in ASEAN 
energy demand by 2035
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Thailand, with its limited production, is experiencing an ever-widening gap in net oil imports. 
There are a few undeveloped, yet marginal fi elds in the offshore areas of Cambodia, 
Myanmar and Vietnam. Other potential offshore and deep-water exploration opportunities 
exist in the region, but these are in contested areas such as the South China Sea. 
And even if these areas were developed, it would likely not be enough to meaningfully 
offset declining upstream yield. By 2035, oil production across ASEAN will have 
fallen by a third to 1.7 mb/d.7 
Petroleum security in ASEAN must therefore be more downstream facing.
Also, in January this year, China 
National Petroleum Company’s US$2.5 
billion investment into a 2,400 km 
crude oil pipeline came online, which 
links the deep seaport at Kyaukpyu in 
western Myanmar to Kunming, Yunan in 
south-western China. This pipeline runs 
parallel to a natural gas pipeline that 
came online last October. And although 
10 percent of the gas is slated to remain 
in Myanmar, all of the pipeline’s 440,000 
bpd of crude capacity goes direct to 
Kunming, where a new refi nery is currently 
being built. This is key to China’s 
own energy security as it by passes 
the Straits of Malacca, through which 
80 percent of its current imports pass. 
In return, Myanmar expects to receive 
US$53 billion in royalties after 30 years.10 
Although these investments are certainly 
welcome, they do not reduce dependency 
on the Gulf, nor address competing demand 
interests in the region (refer to Figure 3).
Captive buyers
Perhaps ASEAN members could avoid 
Saudi dependency and count on the 
global market for oil to ensure access 
and stable supply. The logic here is that 
oil would go to the highest bidder, and an 
integrated global market could alleviate 
regional disruptions—such that a price 
hike anywhere would mean a price hike 
everywhere. In this manner, there would 
always be an opportunity to purchase 
crude at a competitive price. ASEA N 
members could even strengthen their 
trade position through a more united 
bargaining posture. Unfortunately, this 
kind of thinking is mistaken.
THE OIL SUPPLY CHAIN
The system in which oil is produced, distributed and consumed 
throughout the world relies on two primary functions—upstream and 
downstream operations. Upstream operations consist of exploration 
and production of crude oil, whereas downstream involves refi ning and 
distribution of the fi nal product. Upstream operations are dominated 
by national oil companies operating in net producing regions such 
as the Middle East. This is contrasted by downstream operations that 
are typically owned by international oil companies operating in net 
consuming regions in North America, Europe, and Asia Pacifi c. 
The separation between upstream and downstream operations 
is important. First, net oil producing countries, by and large, are 
geographically distant from net consuming countries, and they do 
not typically export refi ned product because it would diminish the 
economies of scale realised by shipping a single type of product—in 
this case crude oil. Second, the quality of crude oil is more stable than 
refi ned product, such as gasoline, which diminishes in quality over 
time. This makes crude oil more advantageous in terms of inventory 
and storage. Finally, producing countries have a greater diversity of 
markets to which they can sell their product by shipping crude oil. Since 
consuming countries use petroleum in a variety of ways, producing 
countries can maximise their consumer base by selling a versatile 
unrefi ned product as opposed to a specialised refi ned product.
FOCUSING DOWNSTREAM
The Vietnamese Government has decided to further secure its supply and limit 
its reliance on imported refi ned product by developing additional refi ning capacity. 
Take for instance, the Nhon Hoi refi nery project, a 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) 
facility being financed through a joint venture between Vietnamese partners—
the state-controlled Thai company PTT (formerly known as the Petroleum 
Authority of Thailand) and Saudi Aramco, which is contracted to supply the 
crude feedstock.8
Myanmar, which still imports 80 percent of its refi ned product, is proposing to 
invest in several new docking, refi ning and storage facilities. One of these is being developed 
by the Chinese state-owned company, Guangdong Zhenrong Energy, which plans for a 
116,000 bpd refi nery and a 150,000 tonne crude oil dock with additional warehousing 
and logistics facilities.9
Oil markets have 
now become more 
regionalised than 
ever before.
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MAJOR CRUDE OIL TRADE FLOWS 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (2011) 
MILLION BARRELS PER DAY
FIGURE 3 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2011)
NOT QUITE FUNGIBLE
Regardless of what conventional wisdom 
dictates, oil is not a fungible commodity. 
Fungibility requires a free market for 
trade, and in this respect, the market 
for oil faces profound government 
intervention in say, disparate domestic 
protection and environmental policies. 
Moreover, there is extraordinary diversity 
in the types of crude oil traded, which 
requires different means of processing 
at varying levels of sophistication. At 
the same time, even a versatile refi nery 
cannot instantaneously switch between 
crude variants or different combinations 
of blends. In each iteration, the plant 
would need to be recalibrated, often with 
ineffi cient results. 
There are also physical limitations 
to moving large quantities of crude. And 
most of ASEAN’s crude imports pass 
through a sea lane that is subject to a 
highly sensitive chokepoint: the Straits of 
Malacca. While pipelines are expensive 
to build, they are a more effi cient means 
of transporting oil than by ship. Pipelines 
also provide stickier prices and increase 
access reliability, as production is 
essentially held captive. In fact, only 
about half of all oil in the world is shipped 
by tanker, which is often loaded at the 
endpoint of a pipeline, thus incurring 
additional costs. And when it comes to 
waterborne oil trade, Saudi Arabia is by 
far the largest, lowest-cost producer of 
light sweet crude. It is the most infl uential 
determinant of price and that price is 
decided by policies deemed most benefi cial 
to the Saudi Kingdom. Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia strategically imposes destination 
and resale restrictions. Importers are not 
free to resell to the highest bidder. All 
of these factors result in more fractured 
and regionalised markets for oil 
commodities. In fact, oil markets have 
now become more regionalised than 
ever before.11
A call for cooperation and investment
ASEA N countries must avoid becoming complacent in light of the persistently 
low petroleum prices caused by ramped up Saudi production of light sweet crude 
and its price inf luence on waterborne trade. They should instead take advantage 
of the low price environment to push through policy reform that strengthens 
their petroleum security with an emphasis on investment, collaboration and 
subsidy reduction.
Investment in downstream and upstream infrastructure is needed to meet increasing 
levels of demand. More must be done in terms of maximising recovery efforts in 
mature fields, and also developing new prospects. This kind of investment is 
expensive and often requires private sector expertise and technological knowhow. 
Thailand’s recent political wrangling over revising its petroleum concession laws (in place 
since 1971), are not encouraging. Under a proposed new ruling, the Royal Thai 
Government would receive 80% of the profits derived from private sector 
investment—up from the 67% it enjoys today.12 This sends a dangerous signal, 
especially since profi t margins are already much thinner when it comes to advanced 
extraction techniques and developing new, more diffi cult fi elds.
ASEAN as a whole also needs greater fl exibility in terms of refi ning capacity so 
as to take advantage of more diverse forms of crude. Reduced regulatory 
uncertainties across the board through long-term policy agreements and increased 
transparency would help attract private investment into the region’s petroleum 
infrastructure—as without such assurances, private investors are far less willing to 
spend billions on advanced refi neries and technically challenging fi elds.
The ASEAN countries should also work together to further scale back fossil 
fuel subsidies, especially in the transportation sector. Petroleum consumption 
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subsidies alone cost these governments 
around US$34 billion a year.13 Reducing 
these subsidies would go a long way towards 
spurring downstream investment. It would 
also make continued reductions in oil 
import tariffs, both within and outside 
ASEAN, more attractive. 
The adoption of unifi ed fl eet emission 
standards could further increase effi ciencies. 
Understandably, these are sensitive policy 
areas, as these subsidies were originally 
introduced to alleviate the burden of 
transportation fuel costs on lower income 
consumers, and intended to decrease the 
cost of doing business. But at this point, such 
policies do more harm than good by distorting 
demand and creating waste. More effi cient 
fuel consumption would help in reducing 
government budget deficits and create 
more resilient economies by alleviating 
potential supply disruptions and lowering 
carbon intensity. Member countries must 
continue their transition from oil as a means 
to generate electricity, which accounts for 
about 10%  of generation. ASEAN countries 
should work together to develop other power 
options such as increased use of renewables, 
natural gas (which it is rich in), more cross-
border gas pipeline interconnections, and 
greater grid transmission integration. 
Perhaps the ASEAN Economic Community 
will provide such a forum to make these 
reforms possible and pave the way for 
ambitious investment and coordination 
in the region’s energy security.
If not enough is done, the increased 
reliance on Middle Eastern crude, as 
domestic production declines while overall 
demand across all of Asia increases, could 
become a serious economic drag on ASEAN 
countries in the future.
SNAPSHOT ON SINGAPORE
Singapore is a critical node in Asia’s access to oil, and especially for 
refi ned product. It is a key player in the region’s petroleum security. The 
country is unique in that it is a net exporter of both refi ned and unrefi ned 
product by virtue of being an entrepôt trader—despite completely 
lacking in natural resources as a small island city-state of less than 700 
square kilometres. Regardless, its advantageous location on the Straits 
of Malacca provides it strategic access to countries throughout the Asia 
Pacifi c. Endowed with a deep-water port that can accommodate any 
class of ship, Singapore has become an industrial and commercial hub 
connecting energy producers in the Middle East to high-growth markets 
in Asia that export refi ned product to the rest of the world.
In 2014 Singapore held an estimated current account surplus of 
US$74.5 billion, one of the world’s highest.14 This surplus was largely 
achieved through fi nancial services, refi ned petroleum products, and 
petrochemical exports. 
Currently, the country has a refi ning capacity of around 1.4 mb/d, 
which is exported throughout Asia.15 China, Japan, Indonesia, Hong 
Kong, and Malaysia are Singapore’s largest product export destinations. 
Singapore’s storage capacity is equally impressive. It holds 31.8 million 
barrels in crude, and an additional 64.5 million in refi ned product.16 
Combined independent storage capacity is about 55 million barrels, 
and is owned by a handful of oil trading companies. All of these facilities 
are located on Jurong Island, from which Singapore has access to 
the entire Asia-Pacifi c market. However, the country faces increased 
competition as new refi nery operations come online in Saudi Arabia, 
India, Vietnam and China.
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